Anachronism or Illumination?:Genesis 1 and Creation ex nihilo by Ticciati, Susannah
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Ticciati, S. (2017). Anachronism or Illumination? Genesis 1 and Creation ex nihilo. Anglican Theological Review,
99(4), 691-712.
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
ATR/99 Λ
Anachronism or Illumination? 
Genesis 1 and Creation ex nihilo
Susannah Ticciati*
The aim of this article is to explore the relation between scriptural 
interpretation, ambiguity, and truth, with a view to testing the 
following hypothesis: “Chnstian doctnne has the role of presero- 
ing scnptures generativity by holding open its ambiguityThe 
h ypothesis is tested by way of a case study focused on the opening 
of Genesis and the doctnne of creation ex nihilo. The article chai- 
lenges the assumption that the use of the latter as a hermeneutical 
rule for the former is anachronistic, arguing that such an assump- 
tion involves a category mistake, and offering (by contrast) a semi- 
otic account of interpretation according to which a texts tmth 
unfolds over time. The article responds to a more specific theologi- 
cal and hermeneutical cntique of the doctnne of creation ex nihilo 
by showing how it generatively holds open the ambiguity of Gen- 
esis 1:1-4, making way for life-giving readings of scnpture that 
heal contextually specific sin.
1 In the beginning [hereshit], God created the heavens and the 
earth. 2 The earth was without form and void [tohu vabohu], and 
darkness was over the face of the deep [tehom]. And the Spirit 
of God [mach elohim] was hovering over the face of the waters.
3 And God said, “Let there be light,” and there was light.4 And 
God saw that the light was good. And God separated the light 
from the darkness. (Gen. 1:1-4, ESV)
The opening of Genesis is full of ambiguities. Many of these arise 
from its puzzling second verse. Does the tohu vabohu of verse 2 pre- 
exist Gods act of creation in verse 1, or is it, too, created by God? 
Does it indicate chaos in opposition to the order of verses 3 and 4, or
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potential for that order? Is the darkness of verse 2 to be identified 
with or distinguished from the darkness of verse 3? Does the omission 
of a pronouncement of God that the darkness was good imply that 
only the light was good? Is the mach elohim the Spirit of God or an 
almighty wind? Are the waters a threat to creation or a locus for the 
generation of life? Moreover, there is a grammatical ambiguity intro- 
duced by the unusual form bereshit, which can be taken to turn the 
first verse into a subordinate clause, leading to a translation along 
the following lines: “At the beginning of the creation of heaven and 
earth when the earth was without form and void . . . God said 4Let 
there be ... ”1י
Gathering these questions together, we might ask the following: 
Is the state depicted in verse 2 rejected by God, posited by God, or 
merely formed by God? And further, is it good or evil?
In this article, my aim is to explore the relation between inter- 
pretation, ambiguity, and truth by way of a case study focused on the 
opening of Genesis and its relationship with the doctrine of creation 
out of nothing (or creation ex nihilo). I will set out from some broad 
hermeneutical presuppositions, to be outlined below. These will issue 
in a more specific hypothesis, to be tested by way of the case study, 
which will in turn enable the broader hermeneutical framework to 
be fleshed out theologically. I test the following hypothesis: Christian 
doctrine has the role of preserving scripture s generativity by holding 
open its ambiguity. The case study will test the hypothesis with re- 
spect to the doctrine of creation ex nihilo and its use as a hermeneuti- 
cal rule for the opening of Genesis.
The article is structured as follows. Having established the broad 
hermeneutical framework in the first section, I focus in the second 
on creation ex nihilo and Genesis 1, responding to the preliminary 
charge of anachronism. In a third section I expound an alternative 
theological reading of Genesis 1 by Catherine Keller, in which the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo comes under substantive attack. In a 
fourth section I offer a conceptual-theological response, reconceiving 
and rehabilitating the logic of the doctrine. And in a final section I of- 
fer an exegetical-hermeneutical response, arguing against both Keller
692 Anglican Theological Review
1 This is the medieval Jewish commentator Rashis translation. Pentateuch with 
Tarhum, Onkelos, Haptaroth and Rashis Commentary: Genesis, trans. M. Rosen- 
baum and A. M. Silbermann (New York: Hebrew Publishing Co., 1965), 2. Modem 
commentators tend to adopt something nearer Rashis translation in preference to 
the traditional ESV cited above.
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and her nemesis, Karl Barth, for the appropriateness of the doctrine 
as a hermeneutical rule, in the light of its ability to hold open the gen- 
erative ambiguities of Genesis 1.
Hermeneutical Framework
The ambiguities of the opening of Genesis, I suggest, are not 
coincidental to its status as Holy Scripture. More specifically, I haz- 
ard, they are intrinsic to its ability to sustain flourishing communities 
over broad stretches of space and time: I link scripture’s ambiguity to 
its generativity or life-giving power, surmising that the character and 
scope of scriptures truth has to do precisely with its power to give life.
My proposal has two foils. The first is a hermeneutic that reduces 
a texts capacity for truth telling to its origins, binding its meaning to 
a putative authorial intention, or to the way it would have been un- 
derstood in its “original” context. On my account, by contrast, a text 
is situated within a wider web of signs in interrelation with which the 
texts own signs gain their signification. This wider web is variously 
expanded, contracted, and transmuted over time, bringing the text’s 
signs into new relations that transform their significance by generat- 
ing new patterns of relation or habits of interpretation. This ability 
to enter into new relations is tantamount to the textual signs’ ability to 
transcend their “original” context of signification. To reduce the text 
to its origins is to freeze the semiotic web.
The second foil is a hermeneutic that recognizes different “con- 
texts of signification” or “frames of reference,” ranging them alongside 
one another as generative of various meanings or habits of interpre- 
tation. The problem here is that the connections between disparate 
frames of reference are lost to view, and are so because the one who 
does the ranging has been elided. She becomes a mere voyeur of in- 
commensurable interpretations, not inhabiting any of them and un- 
able to adjudicate between them. But this belies her ability, displayed 
in the way she ranges them alongside one another, to compare and 
contrast them, and thus to bring them under the auspices of certain 
common questions. In doing so, she reveals a wider semiotic web in 
which they (and she) are virtually situated, actualizing that web in her 
act of comparative interpretation. Without recognition of this wider 
web, the text’s potential truth, while no longer reduced to origins, 
instead fragments into multiple, incommensurable truths, reflecting 
multiple, incommensurable realities. A reduction to origins is re- 
placed by a reductionist relativism.
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To recognize a wider semiotic web, by contrast, is to entertain 
a potentially unified reality in which otherwise disparate contexts of 
signification inhere and to which the significations generated within 
them contribute. “Truth,” on this hypothesis, is consonance with and 
coherence in that unified reality. A text signifies truly, or contributes 
to the truth, insofar as it displays and fosters that reality by generat- 
ing habits of interpretation that are consonant with and cohere in it. 
Untruthful habits will in the long run be shown up to be illusory or fic- 
tional in respect of this reality, ultimately unable to sustain themselves 
as they are resisted and replaced by habits that are confirmed rather 
than contradicted over time.2 Note here that truth is both discovered 
and made by the activity of signification or semiosis. While not fram- 
ing it semiotically, Jeffrey Stout makes an analogous hermeneutical 
point when he says,
Interpretation need not cease to be discovery because it 
requires this much creation in the service of interest and 
purpose. An interpretation involving no creativity . . . could 
consist in nothing more than repetition of the text itself. 
Readings are either creative or superfluous.3
I will capture the semiotic conjunction of “revealing something about” 
and “contributing something to” by the circumlocution “signifying 
into.״
I suggest defining the generativity of a text as its ability to gener- 
ate multiple semiotic connections, and to continue to do so over time, 
enriching and expanding an evolving semiotic web. On this definition, 
some texts will be true (that is, have a tendency to generate truthful 
habits of interpretation) but not especially generative, since they were 
written for a specific, context-bound purpose (for example, a note to 
let ones child know where she can find the house keys). The more de- 
limited a text, the less its capacity to transcend its “original purpose”
Anglican Theological Review
2 Compare the definitions of truth and reality given by C. S. Peirce: “The opinion 
which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean 
by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real” (“How to Make 
Our Ideas Clear,” in Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel, ed., The Essential Peirce: 
Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 1 [1867-1893], [Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana 
University Press, 1992], 124-141, at 139).
3 Jeffrey Stout, “What Is the Meaning of a Text?,” New Literary History 14, no. 1 
(1982): 1-12, at 8.
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and generate new semiotic connections in changing contexts. Richer, 
complex, more open texts will, by contrast, have a greater potential 
for doing so, and thus a greater scope for the generation of truthful 
habits, signifying cumulatively into the one unfolding reality in maní- 
fold ways. Generativity is no guarantee of truth, but if a text tends 
toward the generation of untruthful habits of interpretation, which in 
the long run are unsustainable, its generativity will also die out. Thus, 
the longer a text proves to be generative, the more it confirms its ten- 
dency to generate truthful habits of interpretation, contributing to the 
one, unfolding reality.
Ambiguity, I suggest, is an important ingredient in a text s rich- 
ness or potential for generativity. Ambiguity involves both multiva- 
lence and undecidability or openness. The more multivalent the signs 
of a text, and the looser the connections between them (making them 
open to more than one determination), the greater their scope to sig- 
nify beyond a delimited context. Stout frames this potential in terms 
of “interest”:
The more interesting the text, the more readings we shall be 
able to give without simply repeating ourselves and our pre- 
decessors, and the more readings we shall want to give. Clas- 
sics will be the limiting cases. We say that such texts possess 
inexhaustible meaning. I would rather say that they never 
manage to exhaust our interest.4
Stout acknowledges something analogous to what I have been calling 
a texts generativity, but I would argue for two related reasons that his 
appeal to interest needs complementing by reference to truth. First, 
his account is otherwise liable to devolve into the second hermeneuti- 
cal foil outline above, with multiple interests corresponding to multi- 
pie frames of reference. Stout may have no problem with that. 
However, without reference to a common world shared by the text s 
producers and its remote readers, it is impossible to account for the 
texts interest for those readers as more than a coincidental possibili- 
ty.5 The existence of “classics” thus lends credence to the hypothesis
4 Stout, “What Is the Meaning of a Text?,” 8.
5 Which is arguably all that an approach like that of Stanley Fish allows, as fa- 
mously articulated in Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authoríty of 
Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).
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that there is a unified reality to which everything tends. Second, with- 
out reference to a common world and therefore a common good, in- 
terest can easily slide into self-interest, being limited to the purposes 
and concerns of a particular community of readers. As we have seen, 
Stout pairs creativity with discovery. In order to justify the discovery 
pole, I suggest, he needs the hypothesis of a common world.
This hypothesis finds theological articulation in a Christian doc- 
trine of creation, which attests a creator from which the world comes 
and in which it coheres, as the one creation of the one creator. A doc- 
trine of creation also sharpens the connection between generativity 
and truth insofar as it points to a creator who gives life. A text can be 
said to be generative in the stronger sense of life-giving if it signifies 
into the reality to which God gives life, a reality God also calls good. 
Evil, as privation of the good, can be said to be that which deprives 
of life, reversing the generativity of the creator. As such it will ulti- 
mately be self-defeating, tending toward death. Such a theological 
vision confirms the unsustainability, or nongenerativity, of untruthful 
interpretations.
Creation ex nihilo: The Challenge of Anachronism
The more specific doctrine of creation implicitly at play in the 
above theological portrait is the doctrine of creation ex nihilo: God 
creates out of nothing, and evil tends toward nothing. It is this doc- 
trine that will provide the testing ground for the more general hy- 
pothesis that Christian doctrine (when doing its job properly) serves 
to sustain the generativity of scripture by holding open its ambiguity. 
If scripture’s life-giving capacity has to do with its ability to yield new, 
life-giving interpretations in changing contexts, then interpretations 
that hinder its ability to do so by overdetermining its meaning for 
a particular community, or by reducing its meaning to its meaning 
“for us, now,” need to be guarded against. My suggestion is that doc- 
trine plays (or should play) this role, offering not a particular, context- 
bound interpretation, but a hermeneutical rule that positively serves 
the text’s generativity and negatively rules out nongenerative interpre- 
tâtions. I will test this hypothesis in respect of the doctrine of creation 
ex nihilo as a hermeneutical rule for the interpretation of Genesis 1.
Before doing so, however, an immediate hermeneutical chai- 
lenge must be confronted. Surely it is simply anachronistic to apply 
the doctrine of creation ex nihilo to Genesis 1. This challenge is felt
Anglican Theological Review
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specifically in the context of the kind of account represented by the 
first hermeneutical foil outlined above. A response to it will thus flesh 
out our negotiation and critique of the latter.
Historical-critical scholarship on Genesis 1, in its relocation of 
the chapter in its putative ancient contexts of production, has made 
untenable an appeal to creation ex nihilo as an appropriate interpre- 
tive gloss on its opening verses. The consensus has shifted away from 
a traditional ex nihilo interpretation toward an interpretation accord- 
ing to which God works with what is already there (as described in 
verse 2). This shift is connected with a shift away from the translation 
that has verse 1 as an independent clause to one in which it is a sub- 
ordinate clause leading into verse 2 (or with verse 2 into verse 3). Jon 
Levenson s interpretation gives clear and authoritative articulation to 
these shifts, the age of his work indicating that the consensus has been 
well-established for some time.6
On the one hand, Levenson contrasts Genesis 1 with the Chaos- 
kampf tradition embodied by the Babylonian creation story, Enuma 
Elish, in which Marduk gains his sovereignty through the defeat of the 
older goddess, Tiamat, or the waters of chaos, whose body he splits in 
half in creation of the present world.7 In Genesis 1, by contrast, there 
is no battle and defeat, but “creation without opposition," in which 
God “works on inert matter” (as depicted in verse 2).8 On the other 
hand, Levenson contrasts Genesis 1 with “the developed Jewish, 
Christian and Muslim doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.”9 The latter de- 
pends, he suggests, on the now discredited translation, “In the begin- 
ning God created . . . understood “to refer to some comprehensive 
creative act on the first day.”10 But this understanding is undermined, 
he continues, by the reports a few verses later of the heaven being 
created on the second day and the earth on the third.11 God does not 
create out of nothing, but divides and separates.12 Effortless though 
it may be, Gods creating is still about the imposition of order, in the
6 Jon Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil: The Jewish Drama of Divine 
Omnipotence (San Francisco, Calif.: Harper & Row, 1988).
7 Levenson, Creation, 4.
8 Levenson, Creation, 122.
9 Levenson, Creation, 121.
10 Levenson, Creation, 5.
11 Levenson, Creation, 5 and 121.
12 Levenson, Creation, 121-122.
control and limitation of “the forces of chaos”: “even when [they] pose 
no threat to the creator, they still persist, and their persistence quali- 
fies—and defines—his world mastery.”13 Thus in Genesis 1, while the 
watery chaos of the Chaoskampf has been “neutralized [and] demy- 
thologized,” it has not been “eliminated.”14 Levenson concludes by 
highlighting the cultic character of Genesis 1:1-2:3, with its implica- 
tion that it is through the cult that human beings can participate in 
Gods maintenance of order, keeping chaos—which Levenson now 
unequivocally names evil—at bay.15
If biblical scholarship undermines the association between Gen- 
esis 1 and creation ex nihilo from one side, then patristic scholarship 
does so from the other, dating the emergence and establishment of 
the doctrine of creation ex nihilo as Christian orthodoxy to the end 
of the second century.16 The doctrine was forged in the course of doc- 
trinal controversy, with its aim of establishing the boundaries between 
orthodoxy and heresy, and in negotiation of Greek philosophical mod- 
els. Two key targets were Platonic “world-formation,” with its assump- 
tion of the eternity of matter (which Justin Martyr had embraced as 
at one with the Genesis account), and gnostic emanationism. Ruling 
these options out, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo was intended to 
enshrine the unparalleled sovereignty of God (which the eternity of 
matter might compromise), and to introduce an absolute ontological 
distinction between God and creation (a distinction clearly blurred by 
the principle of emanation). Argued for by Theophilus and Tertullian, 
it became a settled teaching with Irenaeus.
The relative youth of the doctrine, paired with its absence from— 
indeed contradiction by—the Genesis account, issues inevitably in the 
charge of anachronism with respect to any attempt to read Genesis in 
terms of creation ex nihilo. How might one respond to this charge?
The judgment of anachronism is made with respect to histon- 
cal claims, for example about a texts context of original production. 
It would indeed be anachronistic to say that Genesis 1, in its ancient
698 Anglican Theological Review
13 Levenson, Creation, 65.
14 Levenson, Creation, 122.
15 Levenson, Creation, 127.
16 See Gerhard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctnne of “Creation Out of Nothing” 
in Early Chrístian Thought, trans. A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh, U.K.. T&T Clark, 1994) 
for an authoritative account. David Fergusson offers a helpful overview in “Creation,” 
in Kathryn Tanner, John Webster, and Iain Torrance, ed., The Oxford Handbook of 
Systematic Theology (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2007), 72-90.
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contexts of production, taught the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. The 
purview of my hermeneutical account is much broader than this lim- 
ited historical one, however. It is concerned with the truth of Genesis 
1, which, as I have suggested, has to do with its life-giving genera- 
tivity, or in other words, its ongoing signification into Gods unfold- 
ing creation. A limited perspective on that truth might be gained by 
hypothetical reconstructions of the significance of Genesis in its an- 
cient contexts of production—but only a limited perspective. Truth 
is something that unfolds over time, transcending those original con- 
texts as the text is drawn into new semiotic connections, signifying in 
new ways into an unfolding reality.
The fact that the doctrine of creation ex nihilo was only crystal- 
lized and formulated a long time after the writing of Genesis 1 is not, 
therefore, an argument against its truthfulness as an interpretive per- 
spective on Genesis 1. (It might even speak for it, on the grounds that 
the discovery of truth takes time.) More specifically, the judgment 
of anachronism is simply inapplicable to the claim that the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo is an appropriate hermeneutical rule for the inter- 
pretation of Genesis 1. Alternative criteria for appropriateness will 
be needed. If it is truth we care about, then I have suggested that 
the criterion be the doctrine s ability to preserve the generativity of 
scripture.
Creation Out of ChaosP
Having dispelled the charge of anachronism, I have made way for 
a substantive engagement with creation ex nihilo in its application to 
Genesis 1. A compelling case against it is made by Catherine Keller 
in Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming.1׳ Keller makes for an 
especially appropriate and fruitful dialogue partner because she op- 
erates with a hermeneutic strongly resonant with my hermeneutic 
of generativity. Interpretation, for her, is all about the negotiation of 
gaps in the text, gaps that register a multiplicity of textual allusions 
and the traces left by history. Good interpretations will read the gaps 
without finally plugging them, honoring and savoring the texts “ir- 
reducible ambiguities."* 18 She rejects a privileging of “the truth of the
11 Catherine Keller, Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (London: Rout- 
ledge, 2003).
18 Keller, Face of the Deep, 16, compare with 118.
original,19״ embracing a hermeneutical pluralism that engages with 
“the history of [a text s] effects20״:
God, it seems, has left interpretive gaps in the universe itself, 
and therefore also in the Torah. The world and the text await 
interpretation. Thus the text cannot mirror an original, trans- 
parent . . . meaning. It will make meaning through coopera- 
tive interaction in history. . . . That meaning lives only in the 
relationships constituting the present signifying process.21
While she does not gesture, as I have done, toward a unified reality in 
respect of which one can speak of “the truth,״ her hermeneutical plu- 
ralism does not fracture into an incommensurability of meanings, 
since nothing escapes relationship, and nothing arises de novo (or ex 
nihilo).
Despite this strong hermeneutical affinity, Keller reaches the op- 
posite conclusion from the one I will argue for with respect to the doc- 
trine of creation ex nihilo, declaring that it “brooks no ambiguity.”22 
The doctrine provides the negative foil for her own interpretation of 
Genesis 1:1-3. Specifically, she argues that it has served to suppress 
verse 2 by bringing its fluid chaos under the control of a (male) God 
who imposes order by positing an absolute origin. It cuts off and de- 
limits the murky depths of creation (tehom) by interposing a rock bot- 
tom beyond which they cannot flow, allowing for no spillage. With this 
doctrine, Christian theology “systematically and symbolically sought 
to erase the chaos of creation.״ But the chaos always seeps back in, 
needing “to be nihilated all the more violently.״ In “a vicious circle,” 
the erasure must be repeated again and again.23 Keller does not have 
mere hermeneutical erasure in mind, moreover. The ex nihilo logic 
manifests itself concretely in the erasure of all kinds of “disorderly” 
others, whether those others are constructed patriarchally, racially, 
colonially, or anthropocentrically, and so on.
Keller is careful not to repeat this violent nihilation in her own 
negative judgment on creation ex nihilo. First, she is a generous reader
700 Anglican Theological Review
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20 Keller, Face of the Deep, 109.
21 Keller, Face of the Deep, 119.
22 Keller, Face of the Deep, 18.
23 Keller, Face of the Deep, xvi.
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of the tradition in which it was incubated, exploiting its multivalence 
and retrieving its concealed goods. For example, she notes that Ire- 
naeus s argument for creation ex nihilo serves the recognition of Gods 
pervasive immanence to creation, conceding nevertheless that the re- 
suit is an “intimacy of domination.”24 Keller finds mutlivalence para- 
digmatically in Augustine s Confessions, however. Augustine, as she 
reads him, fully acknowledges the ambiguity of Genesis 1, but plugs 
its gaps by appeal to creation ex nihilo. He recognizes the feminine 
fluidity of the unformed spiritual matter (the waters of verse 2), but 
freezes them in their in/formation by the masculine deity. Again, he 
attends to his own inner depths in the narrative of Confessions, crying 
out to God from the deep, but at the same time names those depths 
original sin.25
Second, while she says no to an ex nihilo logic, the alternative 
“tehomic” logic she develops does not, as its equal and opposite, un- 
equivocally embrace a romanticized chaos. Instead, Kellers tehomic 
theology destabilizes the order/disorder binary by defining chaos “not 
simply as a disorder but as a state of primal indeterminacy,”26 and not 
as “void of relations [but as] the place of all relations, all virtualities.
. . . The chaos—not the good, not the evil—but the potential for good 
or ill.”27 Likewise, Keller does not reject an absolute and totalizing 
divine origin in favor of secular, historical beginnings. Instead, she in- 
vokes the tehom as place “of beginning,”28 which, because it is always 
already there, is the matrix of possibility from which both creator and 
creature emerge.29 Such emergence involves decision: the actualiza- 
tion of some possibilities over against others, at which point the law 
of noncontradiction comes into play. It is (for Keller) in this world of 
binary logic that the doctrine of creation ex nihilo has its place, but by 
the same token it cannot contemplate the prior indeterminacy, which 
transcends the law of noncontradiction.30
To house this tehom, Keller reaches for a theology of becom- 
ing, a “panentheism” in which the divine and the cosmic subsist in an
24 Keller, Face of the Deep, 51, compare with 90.
25 Keller, Face of the Deep, 65-83.
26 Keller, Face of the Deep, 146.
27 Keller, Face of the Deep, 169, 81.
28 Keller, Face of the Deep, 161.
29 Keller, Face of the Deep, 163.
Keller, Face of the Deep, 13.30
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“active indeterminacy” of relationship.31 And ultimately she gestures 
toward a trinity of Tehom (depth), Elohim (difference), and Ruach 
(relationality).32 But she ends by suggesting that this be taken with a 
pinch of salt, since it is another potential device for closure.33
A Conceptual-Theological Response
Keller enticingly portrays a nonothering, nonclosed vision of ere- 
ation, which makes way for proper acknowledgment of creaturely dif- 
ference and diversity, rooted in a prior dynamism of indeterminacy 
and potentiality. She identifies the logic of creation ex nihilo as the su- 
persessionist, exclusionary, and oppressive logic of closure that needs 
to be refused. It will not be hard to offer a conceptual response to 
Keller that resituates creation ex nihilo on the side of openness rather 
than closure, rehabilitating it in a way that is fundamentally in keeping 
with her tehomic vision. This is something that nevertheless needs to 
be done in order to pave the way to the more difficult job of respond- 
ing hermeneuticallij and exegeticallij to Keller’s reading of Genesis 
1:2 in such a way as to find in the doctrine of creation ex nihilo a 
hermeneutical key for the preservation of the ambiguities of the deep 
instead of their premature cutting off. She has read it as plugging the 
gaps; I will seek to reread it as holding them open.
But first, a conceptual response is in order. In the first place, 
Keller makes a basic logical error in her articulation of creation ex 
nihilo. She speaks, for example, about a “pure dualism of onginating 
Logos and prevenient Nothing.34״ This surreptitiously takes the noth- 
ing to be a kind of something, set over against the Logos. You cannot 
have a dualism between the Logos and (genuine) nothing, by con- 
trast, since a dualism can only arise between two somethings. Again, 
she asserts that “creation from nothing requires a space . . . where 
God most definitely is not.35״ But only nothing as a kind of something 
could be such a space. Such claims confirm our suspicions that when, 
at the opening of her first chapter, she asks, “Are we not created from 
this nothing—this bottomless shadow?,”36 this is no mere rhetorical
Anglican Theological Review
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32 Keller, Face of the Deep, 231-235.
33 Keller, Face of the Deep, 238.
34 Keller, Face of the Deep, 10.
35 Keller, Face of the Deep, 18.
36 Keller, Face of the Deep, 3.
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flourish, but a logical slip that will underwrite her whole treatment 
of the creation out of nothing. Her concern, we discover, is about an 
interpretation of Genesis 1 that suppresses verse 2, treating the chaos 
as nothing. “Would this string of icons together signify nothing but— 
nothing?” While she acknowledges the alternative traditional inter- 
pretation that the chaos has itself been created from a prior nothing, 
her real concern is that something be treated as nothing; and however 
much regress there is before the nothing is asserted, it will always (she 
fears) erase an even earlier something. It is just this that allows the 
shift from talk of nihil to talk of nihilation .37
Rightly understood, however, the doctrine of creation out of 
nothing is precisely intended to deny that creation is out of anything, 
that is, that there is anything prior to creation that is either excluded 
by it, superseded by it, or imposed upon by it. There is nothing there 
to be excluded, superseded, or imposed upon.38 Creation ex nihilo, 
in other words, removes the necessary conditions for violent nihila- 
tion—or anything akin to it. Creation cannot be an act of male con- 
trol, since there is nothing there for the creator to control. By the 
same token, it cannot be the exclusion of female fluidity, since the 
invocation of the latter presupposes the same binary in terms of which 
the (male) creator subjugates the (female) would-be nothing. Once 
the binary is removed by a genuine ex nihilo, the creator is no longer 
harnessed to a male image, being freed by a genuine transcendence 
both from an insidious gender binary and for multigendered repre- 
sentations. In short, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo rules out any 
kind of struggle between creator and a semi-independent creation, 
and therefore the conditions for any relation of hierarchy, domination, 
and oppression between creator and creation. Rather, because noth- 
ing is presupposed by creation, God is the only presupposition and 
context for creation, from which it follows that creation is not external 
to God as something God must bring into shape from without, but 
subsists entirely within Gods creative agency. In this way, Gods utter 
transcendence is complemented by Gods utter immanence.39
37 For example, Keller, Face of the Deep, xvi.
38 See Rowan Williams, “On Being Creatures,” in On Christian Theology (Oxford, 
U.K.: Blackwell, 2000), 63-78, for an illuminating account. For a more purely logical 
account, see Herbert McCabe, “Creation,” in God Matters (London: Continuum, 
2005; first published in 1987), 2-9.
39 This logic is clearly and persuasively articulated by Kathryn Tanner in God and 
Creation in Chñstian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment? (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell
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Positively, because nothing is presupposed to creation, creation is 
not bound by any extrinsic pattern or rule, and so is free to be entirely 
itself, not answerable to an external standard. Thus, its indetermina- 
cíes are to be acknowledged as the indeterminacies they are, rather 
than being prematurely and fearfully excluded by safe determinacies. 
And finite actualities, once determined, are likewise to be acknowl- 
edged as such. The creator, as transcendent of all creaturely differ- 
ence, can be equally the creator of chaos as of order, indeterminacy as 
of determinacy. True transcendence does not foreclose the possibili- 
ties of creation, but is their liberating context.
An Exegetical-Hermeneutical Response
So much for a conceptual response to Keller s challenge. But what 
about a hermeneutical and exegetical one? In other words, does ere- 
ation ex nihilo hold open not only the possibilities of creation but also 
the possibilities or ambiguities of the text of Genesis 1? Keller, as we 
have seen, has claimed that the doctrine “brooks no ambiguity40״: she 
is right insofar as it unambiguously determines the chaos of verse 2 as 
a creature of God, rather than as primordial with God. But Keller, too, 
has closed this textual gap—merely in the other direction (in favor of 
the chaos as primordial with God). To interpret, it seems, one must 
determine. The gapped text is simply the text. The question, then, is 
what possibilities are held open—or opened up—by one closure. Let 
us return to the gaps identified at the beginning of this article, and ask 
how they fare in the light of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo.
A brief comment is in order, first, on what I have called the gram- 
matical ambiguity. Does creation ex nihilo only fit with a traditional 
translation that has been called in question? This would be the case if 
creation ex nihilo were being presented as the content of those verses 
rather than as a formal hermeneutical rule. Translations that subordi- 
nate verse 1 to verse 2 (or verses 1 and 2 to verse 3), more clearly than 
the traditional translation, leave open the possibility that the subject 
matter of verse 2 was not itself created by God, contra creation ex 
nihilo. However, before any other gaps are filled in, alternative trans- 
lations do no more than leave open that possibility. Creation ex nihilo 
as a hermeneutical rule instructs one to foreclose the possibility that
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40 Keller, Face of the Deep, 18.
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the chaos is primordial with God. Our job, as we have said, is to find 
out what happens to the other gaps in the wake of this foreclosure.
The other gaps, so it appears, all implicitly hinge on the problem 
of evil. Is the chaos vibrant potentiality, or an affront to order to be 
rejected? Is the darkness benign or ominous? Are the waters threat- 
ening or life giving? Is the mach a godless wind or a holy creativity? 
Is the darkness of verse 4 a good creature of God or the menacing 
shadow of the light created? Keller retains a fundamental ambiguity 
here: she reads the tehom “not as the evil, but as the active potentiality 
for both good and evil.41״ Indeed, her rejection of creation ex nihilo is 
for the sake of tehom as ambiguity. In this way, Kellers hermeneutic 
of ambiguity becomes itself the subject matter of the text. Or con- 
versely, in Kellers words, “the exegetical incongruities of the creation 
push beyond the hermeneutics of tehom [tehom as subject matter] to 
a tehomic hermeneutic [tehom as hermeneutic].”42
Kellers interpretation is developed in negative counterpoint to 
that of Karl Barth, who takes the ex nihilo tradition, as she reads it, to 
its extreme: “the Barthian deep is not nothing, but worse than nothing 
... if the early fathers repress the dark waters, if Augustine more indul- 
gently sublimates them, Barth s opus performs their demonization.”43 
In respect of the problem of evil, Barth grasps the nettle, interpret- 
ing the state depicted in verse 2 as nothing other than the state “of 
evil, of sin, of the fall and all its consequences.”44 There is no ambi- 
guity here. Tohu vabohu, he pronounces, can be given “no positive 
qualification.”45 Tehom is an expression “for the abyss of that which 
is intrinsically impossible.”46 A “caricature” of Gods good creation,47 
verse 2 is an anomaly in Genesis 1. Barth concludes that it indicates 
simply that which is rejected by God, a rejection concomitant with 
Gods election of the ordered creation, the implicit No uttered with 
and under Gods Yes. Verse 2 thus depicts “the past” of creation, or 
that which is “superseded” by it.48 This “creation as exclusion” is
41 Keller, Face of the Deep, 91.
42 Keller, Face of the Deep, 117.
43 Keller, Face of the Deep, 84.
44 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics III/l, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance 
(London: T&T Clark, 2010), 107.
45 Barth, CD III/l, 104.
46 Barth, CD III/l, 104.
47 Barth, CD III/l, 103.
48 Barth, CD III/l, 107.
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precisely the target of Kellers critique. Here, arguably, nihil as das 
Nichtige (nothingness)49 becomes nihilation (and simultaneously that 
which is nihilated).
While Barth formally affirms the doctrine of creation ex nihilo,5° 
he sails close to the wind in the highly questionable construal he gives 
it in his his interpretation of Genesis 1, in which, as we have seen, 
Gods creation “out of nothing״ is also a supersession and exclusion. 
This is arguably no longer creation ex nihilo. Barths interpretation 
thus provides a good foil against which to develop my own interpreta- 
tion, in which creation ex nihilo is construed rather differently—in 
such a way, moreover, as to respond to Kellers critique. Thus I will 
explore further aspects of Barth s interpretation in order, by contrast, 
to delineate my own.
Barth observes that on the first two days of creation, and on the 
first part of the third, “to create is to separate.51״ He interprets this 
separation in terms of the pattern of divine election and rejection 
captured in the contrast between verses 1 and 2, which prefigures 
and corresponds to Gods rejection and election of creation in Jesus 
Christ—who stands at the center of the covenant between God and 
creation that is the goal of creation. While he devotes much exegeti- 
cal space to each of the days of creation in its own right, the separa- 
tions of the first three days set the scene for the following days, which 
concern “the furnishing of the cosmos״ that has been marked out by 
separations.52 Theologically, and to a large extent exegetically, Barths 
tendency is to subsume creation into Gods act of reconciliation in 
Jesus Christ.
By contrast, a reading according to the logic of creation ex nihilo 
as set out (contra Keller) above, is able (potentially) not only to af- 
firm the indeterminacy of verse 2, but also the determinate creatures 
of the following verses, such that the separations need not be un- 
derstood as antagonistic pairs, but as particular distinctions between 
good creatures. Different kinds of distinction can also be recognized. 
Thus, the apparently absolute opposition between light and darkness 
can, in keeping with the mention of evening and morning in verse 
5b, be understood to posit two extremes of a spectrum in which
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gradations of light and darkness can be recognized. Furthermore, the 
distinction between land and sea in verse 9 need not be construed 
as an opposition at all, but as a differentiation between two kinds of 
living environment (to be distinguished from yet another one—the 
sky—depicted in verses 6-8). All the more so do all the varieties of liv- 
ing creatures indicated in verses 11-27 break free from a binary, op- 
positional logic—multiplying distinctions of many kinds. Finally, the 
distinctions of verses 3-27 need not be construed as in opposition to 
the indeterminacy of verse 2, as order to disorder, but rather to stand 
positively to it in a relation of actuality to potency.
Returning to the difficult verse 2, Barth s interpretation is signifi- 
cantly informed by other scriptural occurrences of the key terms. His 
findings in respect of the other combined uses of tohu and bohu pre- 
sent a special challenge to a positive reading of the indeterminacy of 
verse 2 as God’s creature, and thus to the alternative ex nihilo reading 
I am developing. “I looked on the earth, and behold, it was without 
form and void [vehinneh tohu vabohu]; and to the heavens, and they 
had no light” (Jer. 4:23). “He shall stretch the line of confusion [tohu] 
over it, and the plumb line of emptiness [bohu]״ (Isa. 34:11). From its 
resonance with these prophetic visions, Barth concludes that the ‘the 
condition of the earth depicted in [Gen. 1:2] is identical with the whole 
horror of the final judgment.”53 His alignment of creation with salva- 
tion gains real traction in this connection.
But Barth conceals an important asymmetry between these 
verses that arises on his interpretation. In Isaiah explicitly, but implic- 
itly in Jeremiah (see Jer. 4:26-27), it is God who brings about the state 
of tohu vabohu. The horrors are the consequence of God’s judgment, 
in Barth’s terms. The tohu vabohu of Genesis 1:2, by contrast, is not 
brought about by God, but is rather the passive object of God’s rejec- 
tion. Barth’s neat alignment is not so neat. Might this invite an alterna- 
tive interpretation? In Barthian manner, might we not say that God’s 
unified disposition toward creation can be received by God’s creatures 
either as love or as wrath? In other words, might tohu vabohu, as an 
effect of God’s creative love in Genesis 1, be experienced in Jeremiah 
4 and Isaiah 34, under the conditions of sin, as wrath? In both cases 
tohu vabohu is the work of God, but it manifests itself differently un- 
der different conditions. The anomalous nature of Genesis 1:2 is then 
explained by the fact that (on a Christian traditional interpretation)
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it is situated in one of the only scriptural passages that witnesses to a 
context predating the fall.
I will tease out this possibility in implicit reinterpretation of 
Keller. One might argue that in a postfallen world chaos can only be 
greeted as horror. Operating with Keller s (violent) ex nihilo logic, we 
seek to exclude those others that we cannot assimilate to our own 
systems of signification, naming them “chaos״ in opposition to our 
“order.” All the while we repress our own chaos, projecting it onto 
those demonized others. Moreover, our suppression of (good) chaos 
itself generates the (evil) chaos we fear, both in ourselves and (poten- 
tially) in others. In ourselves: the suppression of our own otherness to 
the order we impose erupts in the destruction of others onto whom 
we project our uncontainable otherness. This imposition of order 
barely conceals the chaotic disorder of sin. In others: the suppression 
of different others may force those others into a position in which 
they can only manifest their chaotic otherness destructively, as they 
seek to break out of the confines of the order imposed upon them. 
Constructed as the binary opposite of order, their (potentially benign) 
chaos becomes rfoorder.
In this fallen context, Gods (re)creation ex nihilo can only be ex- 
perienced by the sinner as a horror, because it indicates a God who 
transcends all creaturely order, and other creatures who transcend my 
particular contexts of order. This would explain the devastating visions 
of Jeremiah 4 and Isaiah 34, interpreted as Gods reestablishment of 
the conditions of creation ex nihilo by the re-creation of a tohu vabohu 
destructive of idolatrous creaturely orders. Genesis 1 witnesses to an 
alternative scenario in which, rather than being destructively pitted 
against idolatrous order, tohu vabohu as a good indeterminacy houses 
more than one possibility of contextual order. This “vague”54 logic al- 
lows the other to abide by her own contextual order, unassimilable to 
mine, transcending my contextual order without threatening it.
This reading, through the lens of a rehabilitated doctrine of ere- 
ation ex n ihilo, holds open one of the fundamental ambiguities of Gen- 
esis 1:2. Is the chaos good or evil? It depends on how it is greeted. In a 
fallen context, chaos (benign in itself) is experienced as threat, leading
54 The reference is to C. S. Peirce, who developed a logic of vagueness (or triadic 
logic) to be distinguished from a standard two-value logic. See, for example, “Issues 
of Pragmaticism,” in the Peirce Edition Project, ed., The Essential Peirce: Selected 
Philosophical Wñtings, Volume 2 (1893-1913) (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Universi- 
ty Press, 1998), 346-359.
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to its suppression. At this point, it is not tohu vabohu that is evil but 
its suppression. However, its suppression creates the evil chaos that 
is feared—in the form of the destructive disorder of sin. Only in the 
confession of sin, in response to the judgment of Gods recreation ex 
nihilo, I suggest, can chaos be rediscovered as nonthreatening gift, 
or as the good indeterminacy witnessed to in Genesis 1:2 insofar as it 
depicts a prefallen world. In short, tohu vabohu is rendered evil inso- 
far as it is repressed and projected outward as the disorder of sin, and 
good insofar as it is welcomed as the potentiality for other creatures 
who transcend my finite systems of signification.
The doctrine of creation ex nihilo, on this reading, makes room 
for a subtle doctrine of sin that is absent in both Keller and Barth. 
I contend that as a result neither Keller nor Barth has room for the 
healing of sin—a state of affairs that, as I will draw out in the conclu- 
sion, goes hand in hand with the kind of ambiguity they maintain in 
their readings of Genesis 1:2.
Keller conspicuously has no doctrine of sin at all. She sets two 
logics side by side: a violent ex nihilo logic in which chaos is opposed 
to order, and a trinitarian tehomic logic in which chaos is brought into 
noncompetitive relation with order as difference. But the former is 
never named sin, and the transition between one and the other is un- 
spoken for. Elohim is immanent to the creational process—one aspect 
of its trinitarian logic—and so cannot be called upon, as might a tran- 
scendent God, to reinstantiate that logic in the face of its distortion. 
What Keller lacks, in short, is a logic of redemption. This she might 
have found in the kind of prophetic vision we encountered in part in 
Jeremiah and Isaiah above, in which the judgment of sin makes way 
for salvation. But she would no doubt find in such a God of judgment 
a mirror of the warrior God of the Chaoskampf ’ whom she reads as 
the polemical target of Genesis l.55 In my reading, by contrast, judg- 
ment invites the confession of sin, which makes way for the reinter- 
pretation and transformation of disordered chaos, and as such is the 
beginning of the healing of sin.
By contrast with Keller, Barth has a full-bodied doctrine of sin as 
das Nichtige. However, as that which in Ghrist, and prefiguratively in 
Genesis 1:2, is rejected, it is never in fact healed. Tohu vabohu must 
simply be excluded as evil; it cannot be reinterpreted, in a confession
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of sin as the corruption of the good, as a primordially good chaos. In 
other words, tohu vahohu as sin cannot be healed.56
Conclusion
My aim in this article has been to test the hypothesis that Chris- 
tian doctrine has the role of preserving the ambiguity of scripture, and 
it has done so by means of the illustrative case study of the doctrine 
of creation ex nihilo as a hermeneutical rule for Genesis 1. How, then, 
has the doctrine of creation ex nihilo fared in respect of the ambigui- 
ties of Genesis 1:2? Let us expand on the answer that began to emerge 
in the previous section.
Genesis 1:2 is ambiguous in two key respects (which multiply in 
further subambiguities). It is unclear, in the first place, whether the 
state depicted in verse 2 precedes or postdates the divine act of ere- 
ation signified in verse 1. It is unclear, in the second place, whether 
the state depicted in verse 2 is good or evil. Closing the first gap in 
favor of “precedes,” Keller held open the second, maintaining that 
chaos is neither good nor evil, but contains the potentiality for both. 
Barth closed the second gap in favor of evil, thereby holding open the 
first, maintaining that chaos neither predates nor postdates the divine 
act of creation, but is simply excluded by it. My creation ex nihilo 
reading closes the first gap in favor of “postdates,” thereby holding 
open the second ambiguity, maintaining that chaos is both good and 
evil (depending on its reception).
The ambiguities held open by Keller and Barth are different 
in kind from the one my own interpretation has opened up. Theirs 
are a neither/nor, an excluded middle, which arguably paralyzes the 
reader. Keller does not help us see how a threatening chaos can be 
transformed into a life-giving one. Barth gives us nowhere to stand 
by premising new life on the exclusion of the old. On my reading, the 
ambiguity of Genesis 1:2 is a both/and (a space in which the law of 
noncontradiction does not hold). Specifically, Genesis 1:2 awaits con- 
textual determination for its interpretation. Manifest as the disorder 
of sin, its chaos must be named evil, but manifest in the good chaos 
of ourselves and others that transcends the particular orders we have
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created, it must be welcomed as good. Thus, creation ex nihilo as a 
hermeneutical rule invites attention to contingent, future contexts, as 
well as to the contemporaneous contexts of other reading communi- 
ties. It is a generative ambiguity.57
In light of this conclusion, we are invited to refine our hypothesis. 
For Christian doctrine to preserve the generativity of scripture, it is 
not enough for it merely to hold open its ambiguity—for there are dif- 
ferent ways doing so. Doctrine must do so, not in a way that preserves 
but ultimately stultifies the ambiguity, but in a way that keeps it vitally 
open for contextual determination.
I began from a set of hermeneutical connections between gen- 
erativity, ambiguity, and truth. These were justified and unpacked in 
the context of a hermeneutical model proposed as an alternative to 
two arguably limited models, one that harnessed the truth of a text to 
its origins, and one that relativized the truth of a text by dispersing it 
over a variety of incommensurable contexts. According to my alterna- 
tive model, by contrast, truth is something that unfolds over time, as 
the signs of a text come into connection with other signs, revealing 
different aspects of the one reality “into which” the text signifies. I 
suggested, finally, that “generative” might be given the stronger sense 
of “life giving” in the context of a doctrine of creation.
I am now in a position to develop this theological insight into a 
fully theological rearticulation of my initial hermeneutic. Genesis 1 is 
life giving insofar as it makes way for the contextual naming and heal- 
ing of sin. Creation ex nihilo identifies the logic of that naming and 
healing, but does not specify in advance how sin will manifest itself 
nor (concomitantly) what shape its healing will take. It holds open the 
generative ambiguity of Genesis 1 by inviting such contextual deter- 
mination—but precisely by ruling out an acontextual determination 
of chaos as either good, evil, or neither. It is a logic of attention, in 
which the presuppositionless God invites attention to be given both 
to our own provisional conditionedness and conditioning, and at the 
same time to other creatures as they transcend those conditions, hav- 
ing identities ultimately grounded in God as the creator ex nihilo.
In our fallen world, life giving means healing from sin. A texts 
truth thus has to do with its redemptive capacity, or alternatively, with
51 To read a text in terms of a both/and ambiguity is, in Peter Ochs’s terms, to treat 
the text as “vague.” Ochs develops Peirces logic of vagueness into a hermeneutics of 
vagueness. See Another Reformation: Postliberal Chnstianity and the Jews (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2011). The hermeneutic developed in this article is 
deeply indebted to Ochs.
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its signification into the one reality God is redeeming. More precisely, 
it signifies into that reality both by the exposure of the sinful fiction 
we have made of it, and by recalling the ultimate conditions of its 
goodness. A generative reading is one that operates with this logic 
of healing. It might do so in a very specific context, by addressing 
a contextually specific sin. Or it might, like the doctrine of creation 
ex nihilo, articulate this logic as a more general hermeneutical rule, 
making way for contextually specific readings. A nongenerative read- 
ing will either address a contextually specific sin in a way that fails to 
heal it, or it will articulate a logic in conflict with the logic of healing. 
Either way, nongenerative readings will have a tendency to die out, 
since they will fail to signify the ultimate reality of Gods redemption, 
contributing instead to the fictional reality of sin that is destined for 
self-defeat.
There is a potential circularity to this article s argument. The doc- 
trine of creation ex nihilo underpins a hermeneutic of generativity, 
which in turn leads to the conclusion that the doctrine of creation 
ex nihilo (as generative) is an appropriate hermeneutical rule for the 
reading of Genesis 1. This does not signal the arguments failure, how- 
ever. First, the conclusion regarding Genesis 1 can be regarded as 
the interpretive application of the theoretical hermeneutic. It is an 
explication rather than a proof. Second, the application involves the 
introduction of Genesis 1 as data in respect of which the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo is both put to the test and given practical outwork- 
ing. Specifically, the interaction between creation ex nihilo and Gen- 
esis 1 has enabled a characterization of that one reality, or creation, 
into which generative signs signify, according to the theoretical her- 
meneutic. Put differently, Genesis 1 has contributed to a more than 
formal account of God’s creation.
Moreover, generativity and healing are about the long term. The 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo may so far have stood the test of time, 
but it may yet be brought in question by gaps in Genesis 1 that have 
unknowingly been suppressed in the foregoing, or that have not yet 
come into view. My conclusion is the limited one that creation ex ni- 
hilo (contra Keller) still has life in it, making way for a viable and 
relatively generative interpretation of Genesis 1. But its ability to sus- 
tain life may and should continue to be contested as it is brought into 
dialogue with very different interpretive trajectories.
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